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Although ultimately the state’s monopoly on physical violence underlies the 
effectiveness of African chiefs’ role in adjudication and arbitration of conflicts 
during the colonial and post-colonial periods, violence has for a long time 
served as an implicit boundary condition of the social and legal processes that 
are at the heart of the work of Emile van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal. It is mainly 
in his last few cinematographic contributions to the study of African law that 
the real or implied violence of the post-colonial state becomes part of the 
equation. In this respect he reflects a persistent, and pardonable, orientation in 
legal anthropology: where there is violence, law is not, and the legal anthrop-
ologist is at a loss.  
 Not so the historian of Africa. If twentieth-century African chiefs, who are 
more or less effectively incorporated in the central state, are the heirs to rulers 
of earlier centuries, violence plays a major role both in these rulers’ 
performance and ideology, and in the ways in which historians have sought to 
understand them. For instance, underlying my earlier analyses of pre-colonial 
state formation in west central Zambia and especially my Tears of Rain (1992) 
is a view of the central role of violence (particularly as surrounding the male 
kings who supplanted earlier queens and clan leaders) in shaping the states that 
emerged in this region as from the seventeenth century CE.2 Violence could 
play this role since it amounted to formulating, for the royal courts, cultural 
norms and practices that constituted a radical departure from the norms and 
practices governing life in the villages which surrounded the courts and which 
                                                 
1 An earlier, Dutch version of this paper was published as van Binsbergen 1993a. 
2 Van Binsbergen 1992.  
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fed the latter with tribute, including food, and with much of its personnel, 
including slaves. The purpose of the present paper is to make this view explicit 
and to begin to explore the extent to which violence can be said to underlie any 
form of state formation in pre-colonial Africa. A vignette derived from a 
nineteenth-century travelogue will help focus on the main issues, but of course 
is only meant as an illustration; the substantial oral-historical, documentary and 
legendary data underlying my argument having been presented elsewhere.3 
 The backdrop to the present argument is the substantial body of literature 
on state formation in pre-colonial Africa.4 Even a cursory review is outside our 
present scope. Let me merely highlight a few themes that will resonate in my 
subsequent argument.  
 In the course of the twentieth century, the exponential growth of knowledge 
of African cultures, studied5 in their own right and on their own terms, resulted 
(after initial stress on the intercontinental flow of trade goods, ideas and elites 
in the process of African pre-colonial state formation) in an increased emphasis 
on internal dynamics of African societies and cultures. In addition to 
archaeology, linguistics, and various ancillary disciplines from the natural 
sciences, historians of African state formation have greatly relied on anthropo-
logical inspiration. The latter enabled them to approach oral data, including 
myths, with considerable sophistication, and to scrutinise them (by way of 
source criticism) in the light of a socio-political reading of the contemporary 
society, in which these sources are produced and in which they are now 
functioning as charters, as rival versions of the past serving present-day 
factional competition, etc. Even among historians of Africa there has been a 
shift of emphasis, from history as a reconstruction of some objective past to the 
production (by local participants, but in a not essentially different fashion by 
professional scholars) of myths on the past, with a view to the present and the 
future.6 Yet the fact remains that historians, stressing narrative, periodisation 
and quality of sources over systematic, theoretically-informed patterns, come 
                                                 
3 Fieldwork was undertaken in 1972-74, and during shorter visits in 1977, 1978, 1981, 1988, 1989, 
1992 (twice), 1994 (twice) and 1995. I am indebted to the African Studies Centre, Leiden, for the most 
generous encouragement and financial support; and to research participants, assistants and government 
officials in Zambia, and members of my family, for invaluable contributions to the research. My 
special recognition goes to the late Mwene Kahare Kabambi I, who for decades welcomed me in his 
royal establishment, and finally (cf. van Binsbergen in press, ch. 8) adopted me as one of his sons.  
4 Cf. Lonsdale 1981; cf. Fage & Oliver 1977, 1978; UNESCO 1981, 1984, 1988. 
5 As least , this is what North Atlantic Africanists have claimed. For a critique of that claim, cf. van 
Binsbergen 1999a, 1999b, and in press, and the extensive literature cited there.  
6 Vansina 1983. 
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with somewhat different objectives to the study of African state formation than 
anthropologists.7 
 On the anthropological side, the neo-Marxist paradigm of the articulation 
of modes of production – now more or less received within main-stream 
anthropology, whatever the vicissitudes of Marxism and communism since the 
1970s – has proved helpful in offering a model for the political economy of 
statehood and state formation.8 It juxtaposes,  
 
• on the one hand, a local, ‘lineage’ or ‘domestic’ mode of production, of 
essentially autarkic and egalitarian village communities of commoners 
(internally ranked mainly in terms of gender and age) based on hunting, 
fishing and agriculture, with 
• on the other hand, exploitative royal capitals or courts; the latter would 
typically not engage in production but would be dependent, for their 
reproduction, on the extraction of surplus products and surplus labour 
from the domestic communities.  
 
This extraction – in the form of networks of tribute, enforced by means both 
military and ideological/ symbolic/ ritual – enabled the royal courts to function 
as nodal points of regional, transcontinental and intercontinental trade, further 
strengthening their dominance over the domestic communities with the 
material and ideological proceeds from these wider contacts. From this 
perspective, the study of state formation amounts to identifying the factors and 
conditions under which the exploitative articulation between local communities 
and royal courts could arise and consolidate itself. The local articulation 
process was often concomitant with the further peripheral articulation to a third 
mode of production: the mercantile capitalism as represented by entrepreneurs 
(in the last few centuries mainly Europeans), which by the end of the 
nineteenth century were largely supplanted (in a further side of articulation and 
capitalist hegemony), on African soil, by local branches of industrial en 
agricultural capitalism in alliance with the colonial state. 
 Beyond political economy, various schools of comparative anthropology – 
all in their own way stressing timeless, paradigmatic systematics over properly 
historical narrative – have reflected on the cultural aspects of state formation in 
Africa. Of essentially structural-functionalist inspiration has been the Early 
                                                 
7 For South Central Africa the pioneer publication is Vansina 1966, while his subsequent work (e.g. 
Vansina 1973, 1978, 1983, 1986, 1990) has exercised great influence in this field. Further see e.g. 
Roberts 1973; Mainga 1973; Hoover 1980; Schecter 1980; Reefe 1981. 
8 Cf. van Binsbergen & Geschiere 1985a, 1985b.  
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State cluster of studies,9 which has owed a great deal to the systematising and 
organisational efforts of Henry Claessen and, initially, Peter Skalník.10 These 
studies have stressed the enormous range of variation of cultural and structural 
traits of polities which were called ‘early states’.11 These studies also formul-
ated useful empirical generalisations with regard to patterns of ideology, 
kinship organisation, gender relations, and the internal formal organisation of 
offices at the centre of states of this type. More controversial but perhaps also 
more profound, the Belgian structuralist de Heusch has for decades been 
engaged in a project that seeks to assess the ‘prehistory of Bantu thought’,12 
bringing out, largely in mythical and ritual material, such repetitive patterns as 
royal incest and puberty rites. This led him to the contention that the cultural 
material out of which the political culture of pre-colonial statehood in east, 
central and south-central Africa was forged, had been available for centuries, if 
not millennia, before the actual materialisation of such states – for which, with 
notable exceptions in north-eastern Africa (Ancient Egypt and Nubia), we have 
mainly evidence for the second millennium of the Common Era. Conveniently 
ignored by the main stream of anthropological analysis outside the German-
speaking countries,13 German diffusionism showed less interest in the internal 
relations between specific African pre-colonial states and their local 
communities; instead this school of African Studies concentrated on the 
distribution and origin of the cultural forms attending statehood. Thus, 
Frobenius,14 after earlier work on other parts of Africa, had daringly formulated 
ideas (not altogether unlike de Heusch’s much later) concerning what he 
referred to as ‘the South Erythraean cultural complex’,15 extending over much 
                                                 
9 Unthinkable without Fortes & Evans-Pritchard classic collection African Political Systems of 1940. 
10 Claessen 1984, 1986; Claessen & Skalník 1978, 1981; Claessen & van de Velde 1987.  
11 Perhaps because of their deviation from the model of the – now somewhat obsolescent – 
bureaucratic, constitutionally anchored nation state of the nineteenth and twentieth century, which 
appears to form the reference point of the evolutionism implied in the term ‘early state’. 
12 De Heusch 1972, 1982; cf. van Binsbergen 1993b. 
13 Anglo-Saxon equivalents like Perry (1927) and Elliot Smith (1929) were to be completely eclipsed 
by the emergence of British social anthropology from the 1930s onwards. 
14 Frobenius 1912-1913, 1931, 1933. 
15 Strikingly to the point is still Becker’s (1913: 303) characterisation of the weaknesses and strength 
of Frobenius’ work, formulated with reference to the latter’s volumes on Nigeria, then recently 
published: ‘I. Auf den Trümmern des klassischen Atlantis; II. An der Schwelle des verehrungswürdigen 
Byzanz [volume titles of Frobenius 1912-1913]: 
‘...[M]an mag diese Titel dem Verfasser verübeln, man mag sich an dem künstlerisch-
persönlichen Charakter seiner Arbeit stoßen, man mag die herkömmliche wissenschaftliche 
Dokumentierung vermissen, ja man mag über den Schwung seiner Phantasie entsetzt die 
Hände zusammenschlagen, – eine ernste wissenschaftliche Kritik soll sich dabei nicht 
aufhalten, sondern auf den Kern der Sache eingehen und die Probleme dieses 
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of the area between the Congo basin and the Limpopo river, and with such 
features as ritual regicide,16 royal incest, firm social control (e.g. through 
puberty ritual) over female sexuality from which however princesses were 
exempted, and a strong astronomical/ calendrical element emphasising the 
consonance between human and celestial (including meteorological) 
phenomena, with the king as the indispensable ritual link between both. The 
flight of Frobenius’ intuitive comparisons brought him to consider even trans-
continental continuities with ancient Mesopotamia and pre-Indo-European i.e. 
Dravidian South India. Other anthropological studies, more firmly rooted in the 
ethnography and historiography of South Central Africa and following a more 
recent methodology, have considered the requisites for legitimation of the state 
systems that emerged in that region from ca. 1500 CE. These studies have 
stressed the extent to which military and trading elites, in the process of state 
formation, have appropriated a presumably much older symbolic idiom 
revolving on the cult of the land – co-opting or usurping the ‘ecological’ 
prerogatives of an older, pre-statal priesthood in the local communities, with 
such functions as rain calling, the warding off of drought, pests and other 
natural disasters, and the adjudication of sorcery, incest and murder which were 
thought to upset the cosmology and to endanger fertility.17 
 Truncated to the point of caricature as this overview is, it may serve to 
bring out that violence has not been given a central place in anthropological 
arguments on state formation in Africa. Against this background, let us turn to 
west central Zambia. 
 
 
Chiefs in west central Zambia: Colonial and post-colonial 
For the anthropologist and the oral historian, the local and contemporary setting 
is the obvious point of departure in the analysis. Today there are no 
independent states on the fertile, well-watered, only slightly elevated lands that 
form the Zambezi/ Kafue watershed. Those that existed there in the first half of 
the nineteenth century now mainly survive in the form of the four chiefdoms of 
Mwene (‘King’, ‘Lord’; pl. Myene) Mutondo, Mwene Kahare, Mwene Kabu-
lwebulwe and Mwene Momba. These are royal figures recognised, and (in the 
                                                                                                                                            
gedankenreichen, unermüdlichen und erfolgreichen Forschers unter die kritische Lupe 
nehmen. Da wird wohl manches schöne Gebäude zusammenbrechen, aber immer noch genug 
übrig bleiben, das unseren Dank verdient.’ (Italics added, WvB) 
16 Ritual regicide has been a theme in comparative anthropology since Frazer’s (1957) Golden Bough, 
first published in 1890; for subsequent work, cf. Feeley-Harnik 1985. A brilliant recent study of the 
East African rain-makers whose precarious relationship with their communities (often involving being 
killed) appears to amount to a rudimentary form of ritual regicide, is Simonse 1992. 
17 Schoffeleers 1979, 1992; van Binsbergen 1981: chapters 3 & 4. 
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case of Mutondo and Kahare) subsidised, by the central Zambian state 
established at Independence in 1964. By virtue of a nomenclatural dynamics 
we shall probe into below, their subjects together constitute an ethnic group 
which in the course of the twentienth century increasingly identified as Nkoya. 
In addition, there are dozens of other titles which lack such recognition and 
remuneration, and which have now been relegated to the status of hereditary 
councillors to the four royal chiefs, if not to the status of mere village headmen 
– their former royal prerogatives usurped and eclipsed in the course of regional 
incorporation processes. As from 1840, the several small-scale states of west 
central Zambia came to be politically and economically incorporated in the 
expanding state system of the Kololo. The Kololo were militarily organised 
South African immigrants who had captured the Luyana18 state of the Lozi or 
Barotse. The latter’s centre was the Zambezi flood plain between today’s towns 
of Kalabo and Mongu. Although the Luyana state was to be recaptured on the 
Kololo in 1864, its hold on the states on the Zambezi/ Kafue watershed 
persisted . It even increased when, with the advent of the colonial state in 1900, 
the latter had accorded the Luyana state protectorate status. In the process, the 
colonial state fictitiously assumed the Luyana state’s pre-colonial territory to 
extend over all of the then Northwestern Rhodesia, i.e. the huge area between 
Angola, the Victoria Falls and Katanga, in most parts of which the Luyana king 
had been virtually unknown and without effective political power. 
 But although the Nkoya kings have been largely deprived of their former 
formal powers, their ceremonial court culture has largely survived. The main 
exception is human sacrifice, which did not publicly survive, although it is still 
often hinted at in court circles. The Kazanga harvest festival, whose falling into 
disuse during the colonial period is not unrelated to the central role human 
sacrifice played in this royal ceremony, was only reinstated in 1988, in greatly 
altered form. The twentieth-century vitality of most other aspects of local court 
culture is especially marked at the capitals of Mwene Mutondo and Mwene 
Kahare, who were accepted as senior members of the Lozi aristocracy and 
hence of the colonially-subsidised indigenous administration of Barotseland, 
even though their ethnic and linguistic identity was not Lozi/ Barotse but 
Nkoya. The complex, time-honoured organisation of their courts has continued 
to define such offices as the Mwene, his sisters (Bampanda wa Mwene), his 
wives (Mahano), princes and princesses (Babana wa Mwene, any offspring 
                                                 
18 Luyana, Lui, Luyi, are alternative local ethnonyms for the dominant ethnic group which, particularly 
in the writings of Max Gluckman and in the colonial administration, came to be known as the Barotse 
or the Lozi. Luyana is also the name of the Central Bantu language (Guthrie number K.31) spoken here 
before the Kololo imposed their Southern Bantu Sotho language (Guthrie number S.30), now 
developed into the language called Lozi (Guthrie number K.21). The Nkoya language is classified as 
L.62, although it is closely related to Luyana.  
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born to an incumbent Mwene), his Prime Minister (Mwanashihemi), senior 
councillors with titled ranks as judicial, protocolar and military officers, priests, 
executioners, musicians and hunters. In addition, the court houses clients, many 
obliquely reputed to be of slave descent. If court office has continued to be 
coveted and contested until today, it is not only because it has offered virtually 
unique opportunities for salaried employment in the local countryside, but also 
because the political and symbolic order such office represents is still highly 
meaningful to the subjects of the Myene. As a distinctive physical structure – 
marked by a royal fence with pointed poles (Lilapa), within which the Mwene’s 
palace, audience/ court room, regalia shelter and royal shrine are situated – 
with at a conveniently short distance the sacred grove where the graves of 
earlier Myene are administered by the court priests,19 these capitals (zinkena, 
sing. lukena) have continued to represent the spatial centres of Nkoya political 
ideas throughout the twentieth century. Nkoya ethnic revival, through the 
modern formal organisation of the Kazanga Cultural Association as from the 
early 1980s,20 has focused on the zinkena, and has been saturated with local 
and regional ‘traditional’ politics. Significantly, the association derives its 
name from the ancient harvest festival it has managed to revive.  
 In the countryside of west central Zambia it still makes sense to apply the 
notion of two distinct modes of production, one domestic and the other 
tributary, each with its particular set of productive and power relations, and 
each with its particular underlying logic which exists sui generis, in the sense 
that it cannot be reduced to the logic of the other mode of production to which 
it is linked. Formally, slavery and tribute labour (the two main sources of 
labour at the zinkena in the nineteenth century) lost their legal basis in the 
1910s, and in practice they ceased to exist in the 1930s. Yet the Mwene can and 
does still command inputs of free labour time when it comes to such tasks as 
the maintenance of the royal fence, the construction of shelters at the lukena, 
and similar productive labour undertaken either for the upkeep of the lukena or 
in the context of development activities (erection of schools, clinics, 
maintenance of roads) concentrated around the lukena. Interestingly, the 
traditionalist and Mwene-orientated stance of the Kazanga society enables its 
leaders to draw on this same reservoir of tribute-related labour for the 
                                                 
19 This is only a twentieth-century development, caused by the fact that under the colonial state a royal 
capital could no longer, as in pre-colonial times, be moved over distances of scores of kilometres after 
the death of the king. However, pre-colonial royal burial sites surrounded by deserted zinkena which 
have returned to bush, have continued to be venerated even if at great distances from the capitals of 
later incumbents; cf. van Binsbergen 1992: 44f, 341f, 451f. 
20 An initiative of relatively successful Nkoya urban migrants living on the distant Line of Rail who 
there have had access to ideological, political, symbolic and career models very different from those 
prevailing in the countryside. Cf. van Binsbergen 1992-1994, 1996, 1999, 2000.  
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construction and maintenance of its festival grounds, not only when these were 
still situated at the lukena of Mwene Mutondo (until 1992) but also when the 
festival was subsequently moved to a new site at equal distance from the 
capitals of Mutondo and Kahare. Formal tribute (ntupu) is no longer levied by 
the Myene, but in practice the customary greeting of the Mwene by villagers 
and returning urban migrants tends to be accompanied by gifts (still designated 
ntupu) in the form of cash or manufactured liquor, while in local production by 
villagers around the lukena (e.g. beer brewing, alcohol distilling, hunting, 
fishing, agriculture) the Mwene’s prerogatives are often recognised by a gift of 
produce.21 
 However, even in this cash-starved rural environment these material 
prestations cannot be considered anything but minimal. They no longer come 
close to the order of magnitude of court-village exploitation in the first half of 
the nineteenth century. Of the military, political, economic and ideological 
structure of kingship at that time, it is mainly the ideological elements that have 
persisted, no longer effectively supported by, nor supporting, material 
exploitation. And, as we shall presently see, even these ideological elements 
have undergone radical alterations.  
 Of course, at present it is not very easy for the local villagers to maintain 
the illusion – which must have rather well corresponded with the realities of the 
early nineteenth century – that the lukena, in a largely implicit but well 
developed ritual, political and economic spatial cosmology, is the hub of the 
universe. The Myene themselves have been active in the outside world, usually 
pursuing salaried careers before acceding to their royal office. A Mwene’s 
interaction within the sphere of the Lozi indigenous administration of Western 
Province (the former Barotseland), and especially within the central state and 
its institutions at the national, provincial and district level (e.g. House of 
Chiefs, Provincial Development Committee, District Rural Council), makes it 
very clear that the lukena is now very much a periphery of the world as even 
the villagers have come to know it. Admittedly, most of these royal activities 
take place outside the gaze of the subjects. The subordination to external 
superior political and administrative which they invariably imply for the 
Mwene’s position, is seldom made explicit but usually covered under 
traditionalist decorum with plenty of respectful squatting and hand-clapping on 
the part of modern state officials and other visiting outsiders. As late as the 
1970s many of Mwene Kahare’s subjects could therefore still cherish the 
illusion that whenever he was summoned to the national capital Lusaka to 
attend a meeting of the House of Chiefs (an advisory body to the government 
                                                 
21 For an analysis of the lukena economy in terms of the articulation of modes of production, cf. van 
Binsbergen & Geschiere 1985b: 261-270. For the court music, cf. Brown 1984.  
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with hardly any formal powers) he went there ‘to rule Zambia’. And even if the 
lukena could no longer count as the centre of the universe, the Mwene’s area 
was scarcely considered a part of the national territory of Zambia. In the Nkoya 
villages, the national political space, however extending to the local scene at 
times of national elections, was usually referred to as ‘out there, in Zambia’.  
 Chiefs, in Zambia and increasingly elsewhere in Africa,22 have managed to 
maintain for themselves a position of respect, as well as influence and freedom 
of manoeuvre in the wider national society far exceeding their formal powers 
as defined by post-independence constitutions.23 This obviously has to do with 
the legitimation gap of a modern bureaucratically-organised state based on 
mere legal authority, in a social context where for most citizens – and 
especially for those with a rural, traditionalistic outlook – the ideological, 
symbolic and cosmological appeal of such legal authority is partial and limited. 
The contemporary heirs to pre-colonial kings are co-opted in order to lend, to 
the central state, some of their own legitimacy and symbolic power. The actual 
distribution of power in contemporary African nation-states therefore differs 
considerably from the blueprint of that distribution as formally stipulated by 
the national Constitution. By virtue of occupying a pivotal position in the 
historic cosmology shared by large numbers of villagers and traditionally-
orientated urban migrants, the chiefs represent a force that modernising state 
elites have found difficult to by-pass or obliterate. 
 This gives the impression that the cultural dimension of pre-colonial 
statehood has persisted in the face of the colonial and post-colonial decline of 
the kings’ or chiefs’ formal powers. However, it is more likely that this cultural 
dimension of court life, particularly the villagers’ readiness to view it as 
coterminous with (even central to), rather than as antagonistic to, the structure 
and ideology of village life, arose in the twentieth century precisely as a result 
of such decline in the context of incorporation in the central colonial and post-
colonial state. Let us explore this point a bit further.  
 Twentieth-century ethnicisation processes did have an enormous impact 
upon the perception of chieftainship in Western Zambia.24 ‘Nkoya’ was the 
name of a forested area and of a numerically limited ruling group (the clan 
owning the royal title of Mutondo) prior to its becoming the name of an ethnic 
group (comprising a much larger number of people) in the process of Luyana 
and colonial incorporation. And since the main distinctive feature of this 
newly-emerged group was its ‘chief’ (during colonial times the heir and lineal 
descendant of the nineteenth-century ruler), during most of the twentieth 
                                                 
22 E.g. van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal 1987; Goheen 1992; Brempong et al. 1995. 
23 Van Binsbergen 1987. 
24 This in fact is a major theme throughout Tears of Rain. Cf. van Binsbergen 1985, 1992b.  
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century we face a situation where being Nkoya is mainly defined by a person’s 
allegiance to one of the four royal chiefs classified as Nkoya. In the first half of 
the nineteenth century however, Mutondo’s capital, far from being fixed in its 
present position, found itself in various successive locations a hundred 
kilometres or more from where it became fixed under colonial rule, And while 
a collective identifying as ‘the Nkoya’ owned the title, the Mutondo ruler at the 
time held sway over an area of thousands of square kilometres. This area was 
inhabited by people who lived in villages which each were ethnically and 
linguistically fairly homogeneous (but the kingdom as a whole was highly 
heterogeneous both ethnically and linguistically). They did pay tribute to the 
Mwene, but in great majority did not identify as Nkoya; they often did not, or 
did far from completely, share in the forms of what a hundred and fifty years 
later we have come to call Nkoya culture. They often spoke other languages 
(e.g. Ila, Kaonde, Tonga, Totela, Luba, Lunda and Lenje) than the language 
which is classified as Nkoya today. In other words, the culture of kingship in 
west central Zambia was not specific to any of the local ‘ethnic’ cultures that 
are commonly identified in that region today, but was shared whatever the 
specificities (in patterns of production and reproduction, language, kinship 
system etc.) of the various local village cultures. And in a way it was shared 
only from a distance. For in many respects this courtly culture was pursued by 
people who, while living at the court, were linguistically, ethnically and 
symbolically relative strangers or newcomers in the region. The Myene and 
their courtiers had relatively recently (a matter of decades, one or two century 
at the very most) implanted a Lunda-derived aristocratic pattern of tributary 
exploitation from southern Congo, with a selection of its administrative, 
ceremonial and ritual trappings, upon the local village societies of west central 
Zambia. The manifest local continuity of the latter (e.g. in terms of linguistic 
traits and particularly material culture including pottery) over almost two 
millennia is incompatible with the tradition of recent immigration from the 
north as maintained in the lukena milieu throughout the twentieth century. 
 It is very likely that the successive incorporation, more or less at minority 
status, in the wider state systems of the Kololo, Luyana and British, served to 
blur the cultural and structural distinctions between the ‘Nkoya’ court and the 
local villages, since now the court was no longer the exploitative ‘other’ but, on 
the contrary, the instance from which the local population increasingly derived 
their ethnic name and identity amidst the inimical and exploiting wider world. 
From an exploiting and terrifying stranger, the Mwene had become the 
hallmark of local ethnic identity. 
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The logic of the village and the logic of the royal court in the 
nineteenth century 
The notion of two modes of production (one defined by kinship, the other by 
kingship, i.e. the social and symbolic organisation of tributary relations of 
exploitation) prompts us to explore how court and village initially defined 
themselves vis-à-vis each other in the local social formation. Tears of Rain 
argues that the sources allow us to trace, in considerable detail, the emergence 
of states in west central Zambia as the imposition, upon an older local village-
based mode of production, of a tributary mode revolving on royal courts – 
where tribute and the spoils of raiding would be partly hoarded, partly 
redistributed to the villages, partly utilised in networks of long-distance trade 
linking this inland region to the very distant Indian and Atlantic Oceans.25 
 In the cultural elaboration of the kingship, we see considerable comparative 
continuities with other African kingdoms as described in the anthropological 
literature, with regard to such traits as: court organisation and offices, ritual 
separation between king and subjects, the frequency of regicide and 
dethronement, the role of regalia especially royal musical instruments, the 
prominent political and sexual role of royal women (even the suggestion that 
the prerogatives of kingship originally belonged to them rather than to their 
male consanguineal kin), the association with Mvula, ‘Rain’ (the demiurge 
from whom the kings claim descent) and with the mythical Tower built into the 
sky (which was similar to that of Mesopotamian Babel – Genesis 11 – even in 
that its building was said to be inspired by human insolence, while its downfall 
allegedly caused a similar multiplicity of languages and ethnic groups),26 the 
king’s exclusive rights over certain aspects of the natural environment 
(elephant, eland, leopard; fishing pools), and the vicissitudes of royal 
association with male puberty ritual. 
 Whatever these regional and continental continuities, the cultural material 
out of which the Nkoya kingship materialised in the nineteenth century CE, 
appears to be more immediately a confluence from basically two origins:  
 
• ritual, women-dominated or at least gender-indifferent clan leadership in 
the pre-state local society, with pacifist intra-group reconciliation, and 
the careful ritual and productive management of natural resources; and  
• a tradition of male-dominated kingship and fully-fledged statehood 
locally introduced by aristocratic offshoots from the well-organised, 
                                                 
25 Van Binsbergen 1992. 
26 Roberts 1973 (Tower); van Binsbergen 1993b (male puberty rites).  
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powerful and (due to new food crops) overpopulated empire of the 
Mwaat Yaamv in Southern Congo from the sixteenth century onwards.  
 
Mwaat Yaamv or Mwato Yamvo is the title of the ruler of Musumba, who 
throughout the nineteenth century was a major political and economic force in 
what is today southern Congo. His name means ‘Lord of Death’. This title 
ambiguously refers both to the violence by which his rule was enforced over a 
very wide area (extending well into present-day Zambia), and27 to the 
spectacular manner in which the incumbent was to be butchered to death at the 
hands of his councillors when his allotted time of incumbence was over. 
 While the kingship strand has sought to legitimate itself by adopting the 
symbolic trappings of the egalitarian and ritual clan-leadership strand, there is a 
strong suggestion of discontinuity here. In the process of state formation, the 
role of women was re-defined so as to push them to away from leadership, to a 
periphery of symbolic pollution and political incompetence, and the benevolent 
cosmological anchorage of the clan leadership in the mediation between human 
society and nature (imperfectly replaced by a new cult of royal ancestors) was 
to give way to an increasing emphasis on both physical and mystical violence 
(sorcery). Hunting, male puberty ritual, warfare and notions of female 
menstrual pollution furnish the ingredients for the rise of a violent male 
ideology – the symbolic core of the emergent statehood. Emulating the distant 
court of the ‘Lord of Death’ from which they had broken away, the courts in 
west central Zambia become centres of terror, not only by the implied or real 
violence supporting tributary networks, but also by a cult of violence 
surrounding the kingship itself, for instance: 
 
• the human skulls that served as drinking vessels at the court; 
• the human sacrifices required, as foundation victims, for the 
establishment of the Lukena, the Lilapa and the royal graves, and for the 
manufacture and inauguration of the major royal drums (Mawoma);  
• human sacrifice as central part of the original Kazanga festival;  
• the well-being of the king claimed to depend on medicine prepared out 
of humans killed for the purpose;  
• the executioner’s axe (shibanga) which, more than the sacred musical 
instruments, is cherished by Mwene Kahare, as the sole regalium to be 
kept inside the palace (rather than in the regalia shelter outside) and to 
be brandished in his solo dance at the Kazanga festival;  
• the court office of the tupondwa, the king’s executioners and purveyors 
of human remains…  
                                                 
27 Cf. Frazer 1957.  
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As background to all this we may point to the region’s opening up to trans-
continental and intercontinental trade, and to a general increase in warfare and 
entrepreneurship throughout South Central Africa; yet such a perspective in 
terms of mode-of-production analysis in itself does not seem to explain the 
emphasis on violence in state formation in west central Zambia. 
 At any rate, henceforth the kingship will present a Janus face to the 
surrounding village society: in certain respects and in certain contexts it is in 
continuity with the pre-statal idiom of clan leadership which used to underpin 
the cultural orientation of local villages, but in other respects and contexts the 
kingship is to represent an abrupt and absolute break vis-à-vis that society.28 
 The breaking-points are violence, terror, exploitation, non-reciprocity; and 
monopoly over material produce, regalia, conflict regulation, ideological 
production, and indeed over violence. If the emergent polities of west central 
Zambia in the second half of the present millennium are hard to define as 
states,29 towards the end of their existence, in the mid-nineteenth century, they 
were states at least in this respect that, conform Weber’s definition,30 they 
sought to exercise a monopoly of interpersonal physical violence within their 
territory. 
 Thus when around 1880 Shangambo, the later Mwene Shamamano Kahare 
and grandfather of the late Mwene Kahare Kabambi I, took the blood feud to 
members of the Lubanda ethnic group who had killed his mother’s brother 
Kalumpiteka after rejecting the latter’s claims to royal status in their area, 
                                                 
28 As I have argued elsewhere (van Binsbergen 1981, 1992a, 1992c; van Binsbergen & Geschiere 
1985b) such striking contradictions in the cultural set-up of what pretends to be a unified and integrated 
cultural system, are useful pointers to structural and historical heterogeneity, often to be interpreted, on 
the political economy plane, in terms of the contradiction between distinct modes of production, each 
with its own history and its own logic before and during the articulation process. 
29 Vansina 1993. 
30 Cf. Weber (1969: 156):  
‘The primary formal characteristics of the modern state are as follows: it possesses an 
administrative and legal order subject to change by legislation, to which the organised 
corporate activity of the administrative staff, which is also regulated by legislation, is 
oriented. This system of order claims binding authority, not only over the members of the 
state, the citizens, most of whom have obtained membership by birth, but also to a very large 
extent, over all action taking place in the area of its jurisdiction. It is thus a compulsory 
association with a territorial basis, Furthermore, to-day, the use of force is regarded as 
legitimate only so far as it is either permitted by the state or prescribed by it.’ 
In a state whose backbone consists of tributary networks, the territorial boundaries are dynamic and 
shifting, but within that periphery the core area is yet well defined. We have insufficient detail on the 
amount of specific legislation going on in the states of west central Zambia in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth century; but there is evidence of some (van Binsbergen 1992: 202f). The remainder of 
Weber’s definition applies fairly well to the mid-nineteenth century phase, when Kololo/Luyana 
incorporation was imminent.  
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Shangambo was arrested by the trading ruler Mwene Kayingu and was made to 
pay a slave and a gun for this criminal offence.31  
 
 
The logic of the village and the logic of the royal court 
systematically compared 
In order to substantiate this line of argument, let us systematically juxtapose the 
cultural logic of the village and of the royal court in ideal-typical form; in order 
to save space the relevant items are brought together in a matrix rather than in a 
discursive discussion in the text (Table 1). However, it is important to realise 
that what is listed is not so much aggregate ethnographic data at the level of 
concrete, observable interaction, but the analyst’s summary reconstruction of 
the abstracted logic of court and village as implicitly, but often also explicitly, 
structuring the participants’ actions, thoughts and utterances. 
 
 
 village royal court 
cultural 
composition 
tendency to cultural and linguistic intra-
village homogeneity; intra-village minor-
ities of strangers (especially in-marrying 
spouses) are culturally and linguistically 
assimilated 
rules over a considerable region which 
displays ethnic, cultural and linguistic 
heterogeneity; courtly institutions, culture 
and even language may in many ways 
differ from the cultural idiom of some or 
most of the villages in the region 
ranking virtually no ranking between individuals 
except in terms of age and gender; no 
elaborate ranking between groups but in 
stead joking relations stressing comple-
mentarity and claims of support between 
pairs of groups (clans) 
elaborate and emphatic hierarchy between 
individuals and groups at the court: from 
the king (who is ritually set apart) through 
royal family, officials/ courtiers, servants 
to slaves; likewise hierarchical distinction 
between court as a whole, and villages 
production the actual and recognised basis of social 
and ritual life is Man’s productive contact 
with nature through hunting, fishing and 
agriculture 
absent, dissimulated, and/or relegated to 
lowest ranking members of the court 
(slaves); material reproduction largely or 
exclusively takes place through extraction 
of surplus from villages  
exchange 
relations 
reciprocity; the items (E1, E2, ...) which 
individuals (I1, I2,...) or groups (G1, G2,...) 
exchange are classified as being of the 
same nature, so that exchange is a two-way 
traffic: Gi → E1 → Gi+1 alternates with 
Gi+1 → E1→ Gi 
interdependence but no reciprocity; both 
internally (within the court, C) and 
between court and village (V), exchanges 
are non-reciprocal and involve items (E1, 
E2,...) which are classified as being of a 
different nature; e.g. royals gifts, office 
and honour for loyalty; tribute for 
protection, adjudication and ritual services; 
exchange is a one-way traffic: V → E1→ 
C never alternates with C → E1 → V; in 
stead, its counterpart is C → E2 → V 
                                                 
31 Van Binsbergen 1992: 397 and passim. 
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kinship inclusive idiom of equality, social 
placement, and recruitment of labour 
power; although flexible and manipulative, 
the kinship system dampens rather than 
enhances intra-group competition; bilateral 
descent and endogamy constantly blur the 
boundaries between groups so that social 
belonging and rights are subject to an ever 
shifting perspective  
exclusive idiom of privilege and rank, 
expressing (e.g. in the form of perpetual 
kinship and positional succession),32 
political rather than co-residential, pro-
ductive and reproductive relations; this 
political, instrumental use of kinship, with 
firm boundaries and clear definition of 
roles and statuses, enhances interpersonal 






the form of 
sorcery) 
not permissible in intra-group inter-
personal relations ; open competition is 
interpreted and condemned as implying 
physical and mystical violence 
taken for granted both in intra-court 
interpersonal relations (in competition over 
power and office) and in the relations 
between the court and villages 
conflict 
settlement 
informal, emphasis on reconciliation, no 
real sanctions 
formal, royal prerogative on violent and 
often capital punishment of major crimes 
and of challenge of royal privilege; the 
court is an appeal court for intra-village 
conflict settlement 
ritual revolves on self-definition of the commun-
ity; expels and redresses conflict and 
violence at the village level, by stressing 
interdependence and unity of the village; 
ritual is in the hands of community leaders 
revolves on definition of the court in 
relation to the villages; half-heartedly 
conceals violent basis of court-village 
exploitation by presenting king and court 
as cosmologically indispensable for the 
villages while at the same time indulging 
in ritual murder; ritual is in the hands of 
symbolic specialists including the king 
 
Table 1. Structural differences between village and royal court in nineteenth-




 The message of Table 1 is clear: whatever the political economy of state 
formation in west central Zambia in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, 
and whatever the cultural history – the patterns of transcontinental or 
intercontinental diffusion, transformation, bricolage but also original creation 
and invention – of the material which went into the structuring of the relation 
between local village society and royal courts, the emergent states in this 
region turn out to be characterised by a virtually total denial of the structural 
principles informing the village communities in the region. The state is a state 
in that its structural principles have been socially and culturally constructed so 
as to represent in an order sui generis, which cannot be reduced to the pre-
existing order of the civil society. And when the latter is a South Central 
                                                 
32 These terms will be defined in the next section of the text.  
33 Source: van Binsbergen 1992, 1991a. 
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African village society based on the reduction or expulsion of violence as 
detrimental to productive and reproductive face-to-face relationships, then the 
matching state may primarily define itself by a positive relation with violence. 
To the extent to which the state represents an exploitative challenge to the civil 
society that it has subjugated and re-organised, there is little premium on totally 
concealing state violence under thick layers of ritual and myth; the 
‘communitas’ of collective royal ritual involving all subjects and explicitly 
punctuated by ritual murder appears to serve the functional requirements more 
effectively. By the nineteenth century, the pre-colonial states of west central 
Zambia were trying to find a form of their own, not by tuning in to, but by 
rejecting the village tenets of reciprocity, pacifism, reconciliation, care for the 
relatively weak (women, the elderly, children) and for nature. It is only when 
these states in their local exercise of power had been supplanted by other states 
(Kololo, Luyana, colonial and post-colonial), that the focus of violence could 
shift, leaving the organisational and ideological remnants of the Nkoya states 
with the task of re-defining themselves in a non-violent and more continuous 
fashion vis-à-vis local civil society. It is then, in the process of incorporative 
transformation, that the pre-colonial king is transformed from a violent and 
exploitative outsider, into the hub of ethnic identity and of a nostalgically re-




‘Then give him to the crocodiles’ 
Thus in west central Zambia (and, I contend, also in many other parts of Africa, 
although the space is lacking here for an assessment of the comparative data), 
state formation entailed the imposition, upon local village communities, of a 
more or less centralised socio-political structure representing a total departure 
from the social organisation and ideology prevailing in earlier, pre-state times. 
 In the specific context of the expansion of the Lunda political culture over 
much of South Central Africa, the typical form of statehood emerging from that 
transformation had two salient features as identified by Schecter:34 perpetual 
kinship and positional succession, neither of which corresponded closely with 
structural themes in local village society. Together these made for the powerful 
organisational and mobilisational structure of the Lunda-ised states, of which 
the Nkoya states merely formed the extreme, and diluted, southern periphery.  
                                                 
34 Schecter 1980. 
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Figure 1. Positional succession (I) and perpetual kinship (II) as principles of 
Lunda political organisation. 
I. The dendrogram is not a genealogy, but shows a hierarchy of political positions within a state, from 
Paramount Chief (A), via regional chiefs (B, C, D), to district chiefs (E, F, G, H), ordered according to 
seniority from left to right. If the incumbent A vacates the paramountcy, this will be the sign for a 
complete reshuffle: he will be succeeded by the incumbent of the most senior regional chieftaincy B, 
the latter by C, and so on.  
II. Again, the dendrogram is not a genealogy, but shows a hierarchy of political positions within a state. 
However, conceptually it takes on the connotations of a fictive genealogy, in this sense that the 
incumbent of the Paramountcy (A) is always considered to be the father of the regional chief B, 
irrespective of the age and of the actual genealogical relationships – if any – between the incumbents. 
By the same token, the incumbent of the regional chieftainship B is always considered the great or 
senior father (i.e. paternal uncle) of the incumbent of the district chieftainship G. Such kinship is 
perpetual in the sense that the relationships it defines are immutable: new incumbents simply assume 
their predecessor’s fictive genealogical position. The combination of devices I and II has a considerable 
regulating effect on succession, protocol, seniority, jurisdiction etc.  
 
 
 Perpetual kinship expresses the political relationships between rulers and 
between aristocrats in terms of fictive kinship, so that the incumbent of position 
A is always identified as e.g. the younger brother of the incumbent of position 
B; political alliance and difference in rank are distinctly expressed in this 
idiom, which only uses the kinship idiom metaphorically.  
 Positional succession, as the complementary device, stipulates a fixed order 
of incumbency and promotion in office encompassing all the senior political 
positions within a state ‘bureaucracy’, by virtue of which all incumbents move 
one place up when one incumbent in a more senior position dies or otherwise 
has to be replaced.  
 The literature on the Lunda realm shows how these organisational formulae 
have greatly strengthened state organisations; and while these states have 
seldom been examined from the point of view of a total transformation of the 
Wim van Binsbergen 
214 
pre-state order, dynastic myths of origin at least bring out the element of a 
historic break, a rupture represented by the advent of statehood.  
 Particularly among the Nkoya’s western neighbours, the Lozi, all these 
elements are very manifest, and can be gleaned from the works of Gluckman, 
Mutumba Mainga, Muuka and Prins.35 But they are perhaps best brought out in 
the following anecdote that was told by the famous big-game hunter F.C. 
Selous about the encounter between a White trader and Sipopa, the Lozi king 
(1864-1876) who restored the Luyana dynasty after a quarter of a century of 
Kololo occupation: 
 
‘In Sepopo’s [Sipopa’s] time many people were executed for witchcraft and other 
offences, and their bodies thrown to the crocodiles. (...) One day, as he [Mr T., a trader, 
and friend of Selous] was drinking beer with Sepopa, a very old man crept up and begged 
for food. The king, turning to some of his men, asked who he was, and learned that he 
belonged to one of the slave tribes. He then said: “He’s a very old man; can he do any 
work?” and was informed that the old man was quite past work, and depending upon 
charity – a very, very scarce article in the interior of Africa. Then said the king: “Take 
him down to the river and hold his head under water”, and the old man was forthwith led 
down to the river. Presently the executioner returned. “Is the old man dead?” said Sepopa. 
“Dead he is”, they answered. “Then give him to the crocodiles,” said the king, and went 
on drinking beer and chatting to my friend T.’36 
 
This is more than a simple tale of royal cruelty, although – in line with our 
argument – Sipopa’s reputation as a tyrant is well-established.37 We see the 
Lozi king negotiating between three different social spheres:  
 
• the state, defining relations between the king, his court officers, an 
animal species (the crocodile) as a royal emblem, and his subjects 
including ‘slave tribes’;  
• peripheral mercantile capitalism whose penetration brings the king in 
contact with European traders, in the pursuit of mutual benefits; and 
• the kinship-based social order at the village level, where commensality 
rules and where the elderly (to whom all juniors are linked by ties of 
real, putative or fictive kinship including joking relations – whose 
standard expression is in terms of the grandparent/ grandchild 
relationship) are to be supported and honoured, but at the same time are 
feared for their obvious powers of sorcery (also considered a form of 
‘work’) without which they could never have attained their advanced 
age.  
                                                 
35 Gluckman 1943, 1951, 1967, 1968a, 1968b; Mutumba Mainga 1973; Muuka 1966; Prins 1980. 
36 Selous 1893: 249f. 
37 Holub 1879.  
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 Seeking to entertain and impress the representative of mercantile 
capitalism, Sipopa’s action celebrates the absolute supremacy of his state over 
the village order, and the absolute rejection of the latter’s principles of seniority 
and commensality. The specifics of the episode are revealing and decidedly 
ironic: it was with a Nkoya-speaking ‘slave tribe’ that Sipopa had found refuge 
during Kololo rule, and it was among them, through ties of fictive kinship with 
specific senior hunters acting as his mentors, that he had received his training 
and initiation as a hunter and thus membership of the ritually powerful hunting 
guild. It is quite possible that precisely on the basis of this shared past the old 
man confidently dared present himself at the court. The king’s action amounts 
to a rejection of all this. Sipopa confronts the kinship etiquette, sorcery 
connotations and his personal obligations of reciprocity vis-à-vis a subjugated 
ethnic group, with the physical and symbolic power invested in the Lozi state: a 
power not only manifestly superior to the old man’s but deriving, as it were, 
from a different logical universe – the state – and implying yet a third logical 
universe: peripheral capitalism and European penetration in general. As such, 
the anecdote is similar to standard tales of Lozi arrogance circulating among 
contemporary Nkoya. If told before a twentieth-century Nkoya audience the 
tale would immediately summon the resentment that Nkoya have built up in 
over a century of domination by the Lozi state under conditions (from 1900 
onwards) of outside, European support. Twentieth-century patterns of Nkoya 
ethnicisation are to be understood in the light of this resentment.  
 The underlying model is by now well-defined, and in the Lozi case rather 
perfectly executed. Although Sipopa was certainly a Lozi king, with all the 
Nkoya connotations in his biography including his uncontested mastery of the 
Nkoya language, one could argue about his being equally a Nkoya king as well. 
Similar tales of cruelty are told about other kings who were indisputably 
Nkoya: Mwene Kayambila (ca. 1820), whose self-chosen praise-name 
(Kayambila means ‘Thatcher’) refers to head-hunting;38 Mwene Liyoka (ca. 
1850), the terror of the Nduwe ethnic group in the Kataba area; Mwene 
Shamamano Kahare (ca. 1880-1913), who gained his kingship under direct 
protection of Sipopa’s successor the famous Lubosi Lewanika I (1878-1884, 
1885-1916), but was deprived from his royal orchestra (the principal public 
mark of kingship) by the same Lozi king when in drunkenness Shamamano had 
murdered his musicians. But these exemplary incarnations of the violent male 
model as prevalent at nineteenth-century Nkoya courts should not deceive us. 
Despite the ideal-typical representation in Table 1 the important thing for an 
understanding of Nkoya political history is that such total departure from the 
                                                 
38 Either through the display of enemy skulls on the thatched roof of his palace, or by metonymically 
conceiving of the cranium as the roof of the head. 
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social and symbolic order of village society was never fully attained by the 
states, which, in the eighteenth and nineteenth century, sought to come to full 
fruition on the Kafue/ Zambezi watershed. 
 For these Nkoya states failed to make full use of the Lunda heritage of 
perpetual kinship and position succession; and they equally failed to build, out 
of the social and symbolic material available, a result that radically deviated 
from that material, transforming it into the basis for a viable new domain of 
exploitation hinging, not primarily on kinship or the economy, but on the 
political structure. The Nkoya myth of state origin hints at transformation of 
the pre-state society, but at the same time stresses considerable continuity with 
the past. Nkoya states did erode the gender-indifferent, pacifist and reciprocity-
based cosmological framework and the kinship structure that informed the 
constituent village communities. But they did not fundamentally surpass nor 
eradicate that ancient, pre-statal cosmological framework, and hence – despite 
nominal proximity to Weber’s state definition – remained inchoate states, 
always subject to the internal kinship dynamics of the dynastic group, and to 
the vicissitudes of tribute and external pressure. It was therefore, probably, that 
in the second half of the nineteenth century the Nkoya states proved to be no 
match, not for the Kololo, the Lozi or the Yeke, nor indeed for the colonial 
state. Not unlikely, the geographical position of Nkoyaland in the far interior, 
where trade routes from east and west fizzled out into ever smaller capillaries 
carrying only a small trade volume, was an additional factor in this ultimately 




Let us end by identifying the wider implications of the views presented in this 
paper on the basis of my study of merely one remote corner of rural South 
Central Africa.  
 Instead of discontinuity, the assumption of basic continuity (in terms of 
cosmology, organisation, and personnel) between state and civil society (i.e. 
between indigenous African states and the village communities they dominate) 
has been one of the implicit tenets of political anthropology in this part of the 
world. Was not the Lozi king as depicted in Gluckman’s classic studies the 
very embodiment of the land, to the extent of even deriving his title, Litunga 
(which – like in Nkoya – literally means ‘land’ in the Luyana court language 
which has survived Kololo/Lozi language imposition), from that identity?39 Did 
not the principles of justice (i.e. ‘the reasonable man’ – since Gluckman a catch 
phrase of legal anthropological textbooks), kinship, reciprocity, shape court–
                                                 
39 Gluckman 1969a.  
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village relations as they did relations within and between villages? Thus 
considered, the pre-colonial African state in South Central and Southern would 
be mainly a village at an exalted scale – and this is a (highly deceptive) cliché; 
it underlies much classic anthropological description and has also been adopted 
as valid by numerous colonial and post-colonial political actors on the African 
scene. 
 A restatement of the same idea of continuity is found in Jeff Guy’s 
somewhat mechanical application of Marxist modes-of-production analysis of 
the pre-colonial societies of Southern Africa, to the effect that  
 
‘…differences between chief and homestead-heads were differences in degree and not 
differences in kind’, [so that the only real] subordinate class consisted of women and 
children, the product of their labour being appropriated by their husbands and fathers’.40 
 
If it is possible to generalise in these terms about the well-documented 
kingships of the Zulu, Swazi, Sotho, Tswana etc. (which of course are not in all 
respects comparable to their Zambian counterparts), one wonders what would 
happen to the picture if violence, state-village discontinuity and state-village 
exploitation were re-introduced into it. I have been enough of a Marxist myself 
to insist that Marxism, which Guy invokes as his theoretical frame, does not 
necessarily imply shallowness for the cultural dimension of our analysis.  
 The history of ideas suggests various possible reasons why, with reference 
to pre-colonial African states, state-village continuity would be stressed by the 
scholarly analysts at the expense of violence, exploitation and discontinuity. 
Let us limit ourselves to the Gluckman case. In colonial, Protectorate 
Barotseland (the fact of its colonial domination was taken for granted and 
scarcely explicitly discussed in anthropological discussions of internal, ‘tribal’ 
power relations at the time), Gluckman identified strongly with the Lozi 
indigenous administration, which accorded him almost princely status and 
which, moreover, was highly favoured by the colonial administration. As a 
legal anthropologist, his window on the society of Western Zambia around 
1940 was that of formal courts of law in the Lozi heart-land of Mongu-Lealui 
district;41 as an economic and political anthropologist, his window was simply 
the Lozi king’s court at Lealui. Building up professional respectability was still 
high on the agenda of the young anthropological discipline when Gluckman’s 
career was at its peak, but of comparable priority – and laudably so, in the face 
of blatant racism and colonial arrogance – was the vindication of the colonial 
African subject as capable of creating and governing responsible, well-ordered 
societies based on philosophical and cosmological principles not inferior to 
                                                 
40 Guy 1987: 24; also approvingly quoted in Gulbrandsen 1993. 
41 On the limitations of this perspective, cf. van Binsbergen 1977. 
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those of Europe. African social systems had to be described as integrated 
structures, and even if Gluckman was a pioneer of the introduction of conflict 
in that setting,42 conflict to him still did not imply a fundamental and lasting 
structural cleavage or discontinuity, but a passing stage to a new equilibrium. 
Moreover, there is no doubt that the Lozi aristocracy’s political ideology 
considered itself as continuous with the (Lozi) village life-world; but such a 
claim needs to be deconstructed as part of political strategy. 
 Finally, Protectorate Barotseland, where tribute labour and slavery had 
gradually disappeared since their formal abolition in the 1910s, had a well-
functioning indigenous administration, whose violence (apart from the 
occasional flogging or expulsion of convicts, and cases of ritual murder only 
very sporadically seeping through to the colonial administration and thus to the 
current Zambia National Archives) was largely structural (e.g. in terms of 
humiliation of the outlying ethnic groups including the Nkoya) and moreover 
could hardly be told apart from the violence of the colonial state itself.  
 All these considerations would converge towards a view stressing cultural 
and organisational continuity both between colonial present of the 1940s and 
pre-colonial past, and between indigenous ‘state’ and village, in Barotseland. In 
many ways, moreover, Gluckman, a South African whose PhD research had 
been on Zululand,43 shared the ideological position of other radical White 
South African intellectuals vis-à-vis Black Africans and their societies. His 
vindicative, positive approach may have a rather direct link with for instance 
Guy’s position almost half a century later. If pre-colonial African kings are 
merely an elaboration of the people’s ideology and social organisation, these 
kings’ contemporary significance for the oppressed descendants of the same 
people could be viewed in a far more positive light than if these kings, in their 
own way, represented forms of cultural discontinuity, exploitation and violence 
not entirely incomparable to those of the apartheid state. The struggle for a 
balanced assessment of violence in pre-colonial Africa as against the colonial 
situation has understandably been a major theme in modern African literature 
since Stanlake Samkange’s On trial for my country,44 and Yambo 
Ouologuem’s Le devoir de violence.45 
 And these are not just fine points of scholarship or belles lettres. The 
issues, intimately related, of violence and the socially constructed and 
cherished images of pre-colonial African society have become crucial in the 
                                                 
42 Cf. Gluckman 1955, 1963. 
43 Gluckman 1940; it cannot be ruled out that he did project Zulu models – with perhaps more intrinsic 
continuity – onto Barotseland. 
44 Samkange 1966. 
45 Ouologuem 1968. 
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transformation of South Africa today. In the decade before majority rule was 
established in South Africa, the main Zulu ethnic organisation, Inkatha, 
dreamed of Shaka’s Zulu’s state nearely two centuries ago, and found there the 
inspiration for a type of inter-ethnic and inter-racial violence which were no 
longer abhorred but appeared as hallowed by tradition or identity.46 In such a 
present, where the image of past chiefly violence leads to simulacra of violence 
on the contemporary political scene, a fresh look at historical contradictions 
may be helpful to come to terms with the future.47 
                                                 
46 Cf. Maré & Hamilton 1987; Golan 1991; and for more optimistic view (note the date of publication) 
Schlemmer 1980. For recent re-evaluations of the mfecane image (the chain reaction of conflict and 
dispersal in Southern Africa allegedly started by Shaka in the first quarter of the 19th century), cf. 
Eldredge 1992; Hamilton 1992.  
47 POSTSCRIPT: In retrospect, one further consideration should have been addressed in my argument. I 
sketch a sociology of knowledge by virtue of which Max Gluckman, almost an honorary Lozi prince, 
appears to have had no option but to insist on non-violence, and on cultural continuity, between the 
Lozi indigenous state and commoner villages. In footnote 3 of this paper, I reveal myself to be an 
adoptive Nkoya prince; yet, considering my argument, I apparently have no qualms at presenting a 
picture of the violent pre-colonial past of my adoptive royal relatives, and stressing two forms of 
cultural discontinuity: (a) between royals and commoners, and (b) between the pre-colonial and the 
(post-)colonial situation. Am I suggesting to be governed, decades after Independence, by a different 
sociology of knowledge than Gluckman was half a century before me, writing in the heyday of British 
colonialism? That is a distinct possibility. Meanwhile, considering Mudimbe’s (1997) stress on the 
Freudian Oedipal scheme in the context of the liberation of African difference, it would not be totally 
absurd to suggest that an Oedipal transference from my personal life onto my historical research has 
rendered me rather enamoured with the image of pacifist, clan-based female ritual leaders who were 
subsequently ousted by violent men; or that such a subconscious orientation made me identify too 
much as an Nkoya, against Gluckman (an obvious father figure to me) as the Nkoya’s hereditary 
enemy, a Lozi. But perhaps we need not delve so deeply, and so individually. In Kaoma district in the 
last decades of the twentieth century, village–court cultural continuity, and non-violence, have become 
facts, so there is little left any more for me to be secretive about. From a point of view of the global and 
universalist human-rights discourse of the late twentieth century, or, alternatively, from a point of view 
of self-censoring political correctness commonly imposed on Northern representations of South social 
realities (as part of the politics of knowledge attending African Studies), the unpleasant sides of pre-
colonial royal power in Africa are generally expected to be bowdlerised, aestheticised, or concealed. 
But these universalist and academic discourses do not necessarily coincide with the particularist 
discourse of Nkoya royal circles today. To boast of their pre-colonial forbears’ violence and excessive 
contempt of slaves, even in the face of resentment expressed by locals from commoner or slave 
descent, has remained a trait of Nkoya royals to this day. Naïvely, or in a half-deliberate attempt at 
intercultural identification, I may simply have emulated this trait in my argument. Whatever the case, 
in the decade since this argument was first conceived in the Dutch language, I have resigned myself to 
the contradictions of prolonged participatory social research in Africa by someone, like myself, hailing 
from the North Atlantic region; cf. van Binsbergen, in press. And in my subsequent Nkoya research I 
have concentrated, more than on the violence theme (however, cf. van Binsbergen 1996), on the 
exploration of the transregional and intercontinental strands of the history of South Central African 
kingship first hinted at in this paper (cf. van Binsbergen, forthcoming).  
